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1. Summary  
Civil society is widely understood as the space outside the family, market and state (WEF, 2013). 
What constitutes civil society has developed and grown since the term first became popular in 
the 1980s and it now signifies a wide range of organised and organic groups including non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), trade unions, social movements, grassroots organisations, 
online networks and communities, and faith groups (VanDyck, 2017; WEF, 2013). Civil society 
organisations (CSOs), groups and networks vary by size, structure and platform ranging from 
international non-governmental organisations (e.g. Oxfam) and mass social movements (e.g. the 
Arab Spring) to small, local organisations (e.g. Coalition of Jakarta Residents Opposing Water 
Privatisation).   
Civil society roles include: 
 service provider (for example, running primary schools and providing basic community 
health care services) 
 advocate/campaigner (for example, lobbying governments or business on issues 
including indigenous rights or the environment) 
 watchdog (for example, monitoring government compliance with human rights treaties) 
 building active citizenship (for example, motivating civic engagement at the local level 
and engagement with local, regional and national governance) 
 participating in global governance processes (for example, civil society organisations 
serve on the advisory board of the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds). 
Civil society has created positive social change in numerous places throughout the world. For 
example, Wateraid UK provided over 1.3 million people with safe drinking water in 2017/181, 
whilst in El Salvador, the government passed a law in 2017 banning environmentally and socially 
harmful metal mining practices following civil society action since 20042. However, questions 
about civil society’s value, legitimacy and accountability are increasingly. Reasons for this 
include:  
 recent NGO scandals, such as Oxfam workers in Haiti 
 a growing disconnect between traditional CSOs and their beneficiaries 
 a tough funding climate which has encouraged some CSOs to ‘follow the money’ and 
move away from their core mandates 
 the growing role of new social movements which are able to connect with and mobilise 
large numbers of people 
Increasingly researchers and practitioners are focusing on the role and value of diaspora 
communities and their potential contribution to international development. In 2017, diaspora 
communities remitted over USD 466 billion to low and medium income countries (World Bank, 
2018). Remittances fund both family members’ needs and investments in co-development 
projects and entrepreneurship. The potential role and value of diaspora communities in 
                                                   
1 https://www.wateraid.org/uk/sites/g/files/jkxoof211/files/Annual_Report_2017_18_HI_RES.pdf 
2 https://www.civicus.org/images/Saul_Banos_El_Salvador.pdf 
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development is widely recognise, for example, in the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). Key issues in maximising the potential of the diaspora are reducing transaction costs 
associated with remittances and capacity building for diaspora civil society groups.  
Academics, researchers and practitioners are concerned about “closing space” around civil 
society. Closing space refers to governments enacting regulatory, legislative or practical 
restrictions on civil society, including foreign funding for CSOs and limits on the rights of freedom 
of association, assembly and expression (see for example, Rutzen, 2015). Constraints on civil 
society began following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America, with a second wave of restrictions 
following the Arab Spring (Rutzen, 2015). Both developing and developed countries are enacting 
restrictions (Rutzen, 2015). Practitioners and researchers are actively seeking ways to enhance 
civil society’s resilience and sustainability (see for example, the US Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, who have launched a global consortium to identify specific remedies3). 
Other important trends in civil society include the changing funding climate, the role of technology 
and the role of faith groups.   
There is a wealth of literature related to civil society, its roles, values and trends. This 
includes both academic and grey literature. Consequently, this report provides a brief overview of 
selected issues and a small number of examples. It highlights the trends closing spaces and the 
role of diaspora communities, but each of these could easily constitute its own separate report.    
Potential avenues for future research include:  
 The increased focus on demonstrating impact: northern donors and international 
organisations are increasingly calling for CSOs to demonstrate impact as part of their 
funding requirements. Future research could examine the effects of this on different sized 
and resourced CSOs, as well as the different models for measuring impact (see for 
example, WEF, 2013, p. 16).  
 State strategies for closing spaces: what strategies do states use to demobilise civil 
society and how have these strategies changed over time? Kreienkamp (2017) argues 
that our empirical knowledge of the restrictions CSOs face remains limited, consequently 
our understanding of why and when states seek to demobilise CS remains limited as 
well.   
 The growing role of the private sector in national and international governance and its 
implications (CIVICUS, 2018, p. 14).  
 The changing funding climate: foreign funding is a common government justification for 
restrictions on CSOs. This is occurring at the same time as CSOs are facing a tougher, 
more competitive international funding climate (see for example, the 2016 introduction to 
the Open Global Rights debate on closing spaces4). 
                                                   
3 https://www.csis.org/programs/human-rights-initiative/strengthening-civil-society 
4 https://www.openglobalrights.org/introducing-openglobalrights-newest-debate-closing-s/ 
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 Civil society sustainability: researchers argue that civil society is at a crossroads and 
action is needed to increase its sustainability5. USAID, CIVICUS and the West Africa Civil 
Society Institute have developed measures to assess civil society sustainability.  
 Impacts on gender and sexual minorities’ organisations and movements: these can be a 
particular target of closing spaces, which can increase communities’ marginalisation (see 
for example, Mbote, 2016).  
 The role of faith groups6: religious affiliation is decreasing in Western Europe and North 
America, but is increasing in the rest of the world. Faith-based social, economic and 
political associations and movements are disrupting the status quo in many parts of the 
world in the pursuit of social justice.  
2. What is civil society? 
Civil society has been broadly defined as the “area outside the family, market and state” (WEF, 
2013p. 8)7. For example, the EU defines civil society as “all forms of social action carried out by 
individuals or groups who are neither connected to, nor managed by, the State”8. The African 
Development Bank argues that civil society is the voluntary expression of the interests and 
aspirations of citizens organised and united by common interests, goals, values or traditions and 
mobilised into collective action (AfDB, 2012, p. 10).  Civil society encompasses a spectrum of 
actors with a wide range of purposes, constituencies, structures, degrees of organisation, 
functions, size, resource levels, cultural contexts, ideologies, membership, geographical 
coverage, strategies and approaches (WEF, 2013, p. 8; AfDB, 2012, p. 10).  
Typologies of civil society actors include (WEF, 2013, p. 7; AfDB, 2012, p. 10):  
 NGOs, CSOs and non-profit organisations that have an organised structure or activity, 
and are typically registered entities and groups   
 Online groups and activities including social media communities that can be “organised” 
but do not necessarily have physical, legal or financial structures 
 Social movements of collective action and/or identity, which can be online or physical   
 Religious leaders, faith communities, and faith-based organisations  
                                                   
5 Civil society sustainability may be defined as the capacity and capability of organized and loosely formed 
citizens associations and groupings to continuously respond to national and international public policy variations, 
governance deficits, and legal and regulatory policies through coherent and deliberate strategies of mobilizing 
and effectively utilizing diversified resources, strengthening operations and leadership, promoting transparency 
and accountability, and fostering the scalability and replicability of initiatives and interventions (VanDyck, 2017).  
6 For more information see https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/08/faith-communities-essential-disruptors/ 
7 Evers (1995) argues that civil society is a tension field between state, market and family/community, which 
explains why it differs across contexts: CSOs are simultaneously shaped by the respective influences coming 
from the state, the market and family/community, and generate tensions, which cut across the borders of the 
state, market and family/community (pp. 162-3). Evers’ work also highlights how definitions of civil society have a 
tendency to be normative as civil society, premised on non-coercive association is related to democracy (this 
type of association is not normally permitted in authoritarian or hybrid regimes).  
8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/civil_society_organisation.html 
5 
 Labour unions and labour organisations representing workers  
 Social entrepreneurs employing innovative and/or market-oriented approaches for social 
and environmental outcomes 
 Grassroots associations and activities at local level 
 Cooperatives owned and democratically controlled by their members   
 Youth clubs 
 Independent radio, television, print and electronic media 
 Neighbourhood or community-based coalitions  
 Academic and research institutions 
 Organisations of indigenous peoples  
Civil society occupies an important position in the development dialogue as it provides 
opportunities to bring communities together for collection action, mobilising society to articulate 
demands and voice concerns at local, national, regional and international levels (AfDB, 2012, p. 
10). Civil society groups also provide services such as education and healthcare.    
Changing definitions of civil society 
Defining civil society is not a simple task (VanDyck, 2017, p. 1). The term civil society became 
popular in the 1980s9 when it was identified with the non-state protest movements in 
authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and Latin America (Jezard, 2018). VanDyck (2017) 
argues that there have significant changes over time in the civil society landscape and the 
concept has evolved from associational platforms to comprise a wide range of organised and 
organic groups of different forms, functions and sizes. At different periods, community-based 
organisations, workers’ or labour unions, professional associations, and NGOs have been the 
most prominent in the civil society space (VanDyck, 2017, p. 1). However, today, civil society is 
“recognised as a diverse and ever-wider ecosystem of individuals, communities and 
organisations” (WEF, 2013, p. 6).  
The World Economic Forum launched the ‘Future Role of Civil Society’ project in 2012 to explore 
the rapidly evolving space in which civil society actors operate (WEF, 2013, p. 3). The report 
argues that definitions of civil society are changing (WEF, 2013, p. 5). Civil society is now 
“recognized as encompassing far more than a mere “sector” dominated by the NGO community: 
civil society today includes an ever wider and more vibrant range of organized and unorganized 
groups, as new civil society actors blur the boundaries between sectors and experiment with new 
organisational forms, both online and off” (WEF, 2013, p. 5).  
The WEF (2013) highlight how information and communication technologies have opened up 
spaces for action. For example, there has been significant growth in online civil society activity, 
which has enabled the growth of networks across geographical, social and physical divides 
(WEF, 2013, p. 6). The WEF (2013) highlight the example of the documentary Kony 2012 as an 
example of the ability of a small group of people to rapidly mobilise significant online activity and 
                                                   
9The concept of civil society has its roots in the work of 19th century political scientist de Tocqueville and 20th 
century philosopher Gramsci. For more information on the concept’s history, see Edwards, M. (2014). Civil 
Society. Polity Press.  
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media attention around a topic that had previously been relatively unknown (p. 6)10. Jezard 
(2018) argues that the nature of civil society, what it is and what is does is evolving in response 
to both technological developments and nuanced changes within societies. 
As well as changing definitions of civil society, the roles and operating environments of civil 
society are also changing (Jezard, 2018; WEF, 2013). According to the WEF changing roles 
includes civil society actors acting as facilitators, conveners and innovators as well as service 
providers and advocates (2013, p. 5). The changing context includes: economic and geopolitical 
shifting from Europe and North America; technology is changing traditional funding models and 
dramatically shifting social engagement; and political pressures are restricting the space for civil 
society activities in many countries (WEF, 2013, p. 5). The WEF report argues that looking 
forward to 2030 civil society leaders need to understand how shifting external contexts will shape 
their opportunities to achieve impact and what this evolution will mean for their relationships with 
businesses, governments and international actors (p. 5). They argue that in a turbulent and 
uncertain environment, actors can no longer work in isolation (WEF, 2018, p. 5).  
VanDyck (2017) proposes a definition of civil society as an ecosystem of “organized and organic 
social and cultural relations existing in the space between the state, business, and family, which 
builds on indigenous and external knowledge, values, traditions, and principles to foster 
collaboration and the achievement of specific goals by and among citizens and other 
stakeholders” (VanDyck, 2017, p. 1). This definition encompasses the wide range of actors 
operating in the civic space. In light of the changes civil society is undergoing, the WEF (2013) 
argues it should no longer be viewed as the third sector, but as the glue that binds public and 
private activity together in such a way as to strengthen the common good (p. 5). 
Organised and Organic Civil Society 
Changes within the civil society landscape since the 1980s mean that researchers and 
practitioners distinguish between new/traditional, informal/formal, and organised/organic forms of 
civil society actors (see for example, WEF, 2013). VanDyck (2017) refers to organised or 
traditional civil society and new actors or organic civil society. 
Organised civil society 
CSOs encompass a wide range of groups, from local community-based organisations to highly 
professionalised international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 
1). Large development actors and political institutions largely rely on, and sometimes define, civil 
society in terms of CSOs. For example, the World Bank defines civil society as:  
“the wide array of non-governmental and not for profit organisations that have a presence 
in public life, express the interests and values of their members and others, based on 
                                                   
10 Kony 2012 was released by the campaign group Invisible Children, received 100 million views in 6 days and 
resulted in 3.7 million citizen pledges calling for the arrest of Joseph Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army in Uganda. Invisible Children argue that this contributed to the ISA’s President Obama reauthorizing the US 
mission to support the African Union in combatting Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army (for more information 
see https://invisiblechildren.com/kony-2012/). There were a number of problems with Invisible Children’s Kony 
2012 campaign, which in part led to the dissolution of the organisation in 2015 (for more information see 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/12/30/why-did-invisible-children-
dissolve/?utm_term=.10b6985e195f).  
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ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil society 
organisations therefore refer to a wide array of organisations: community groups, NGOs, 
labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organisations, faith-based organisations, 
professional associations, and foundations”11 
The governance structures of CSOs are varied but are by their very nature independent of direct 
government control and management (Tomlinson, 2013). One study suggests that NGOs, a 
prominent type of CSOs, across 40 countries represent USD 2.2 trillion in operating expenditures 
and employ the equivalent of 54 million full-time workers with a global volunteer workforce of 
over 350 million people (Jezard, 2018). At the national level, the number of CSOs has also 
increased in developing and emerging economies (WEF, 2013, p. 6). India and China are 
estimated to have large numbers of NGOs: 460,000 and 3.3 million respectively (WEF, 2013, p. 
6).  
CSOs have become part of the development process, both on the ground, where they may be 
responsible for delivering services or implementing donor-funded projects (see for example 
Village Water Zambia, a Zambian NGO supporting safe water, sanitation and hygiene12) or as 
part of governance processes. For example, the EU defines CSOs as an organisational structure 
whose members serve the general interest through a democratic process, and which plays the 
role of mediator between public authorities and citizens”13. CSOs have a recognised role in the 
EU’s good governance, which includes dialogue with CSOs when preparing proposals for EU 
laws. EU examples of CSOs include social partners (trade unions and employers’ groups), 
NGOs; and grassroots organisations (e.g. youth and family groupings)14. In contrast, the African 
Development Bank’s definition of civil society includes reference to CSOs comprising “the full 
range of formal and informal organisations within society” (AfDB, 2012).  
Organic civil society 
New actors in the civil society ecosystem include social movements, online activists, bloggers 
and others (VanDyck, 2017, p. 3). CIVICUS, a global alliance of civil society organisations and 
activists dedicated to strengthening citizen action and civil society throughout the world, defines 
civil society broadly in order to capture the wide range of actors: 
“non-governmental organisations, activists, civil society coalitions and networks, protest 
and social movements, voluntary bodies, campaigning organisations, charities, faith-
based groups, trade unions and philanthropic foundations” (CIVICUS, 2017, p. 1).  
Civil society networks, protest and social/resistance movements include the Arab Spring and 
reflect the fact that citizens are becoming more networked (WEF, 2013, p. 6). The WEF (2013) 
argue that since 2010 there has been renewed citizen participation and expression around the 
world (p. 6). The Arab Spring was enabled by mobile and social communication technologies and 
                                                   
11 http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/partners/civil-society#2 
12 http://villagewaterzambia.org.zm/ 
13 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/civil_society_organisation.html 
14 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/civil_society_organisation.html 
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was supported by the traditional institutions of organised civil society, e.g. trade unions in 
Tunisia, Egypt and Bahrain (WEF, 2013, p. 6).  
Research suggests that the success of non-violent mass resistance campaigns has declined 
over the past decade, but that they have demonstrated the power that civil society movements 
can sometimes exercise (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 5). The success of popular mass movements, 
such as the Arab Spring, has led to governments around the world initiating measures to restrict 
civil society in order to prevent similar uprisings on their own soil (Rutzen, 2015, p. 30) (see 
section 4 of this report).  
Some practitioners, including the CEO of CIVICUS argue that “(n)ew social movements may 
undermine the need for and importance of organized civil society. As people connect and 
mobilize spontaneously, key actors (citizens, policy-makers, business) may question why we 
need institutionalized NGOs” (quoted in WEF, 2013, p. 17).  
VanDyck (2017) argues that there is a growing gap between organised civil society and the 
constituencies they represent (p. 2). This is for a number of reasons including growing public 
distrust and uncertainty about their relevance and legitimacy; organisations failing to uphold their 
mandate in the face of adversity; and organisations ‘following the money’ by accepting money for 
progammes and initiatives that are not aligned with their core mandate (VanDyck, 2017, p. 2). 
Taylor (2011) outlines how groups can also become co-opted by accepting money from 
governments, which limits their ability to criticise or work towards their goals for fear of ‘biting the 
hand that feeds’.  
New actors are bridging the divide between the people and organised CSOs through their mode 
of engagement, tools and approaches, which have democratised the advocacy space (VanDyck, 
2017, p. 3). VanDyck (2017) argues that the challenge is for traditional, organised civil society 
and the loosely formed organic actors to identify means of collaboration and focus on 
comparative advantages in light of the rapid changes taking place within civil society and the 
development landscape (p. 3).  
Global, national, local 
Civil society includes a range of actors operating over different levels, for example, Oxfam is an 
international NGO (INGO), operating around in the world on a number of issues, whereas 
Women for Change is a Zambian NGO undertaking capacity building activities in rural areas. 
INGOs have become increasingly active in political processes and global governance, including 
transnational policy-making, from agenda-setting through to implementation, evaluation and 
monitoring (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 1). For example, organised civil society groups and more 
loosely networked civil society groups are engaged in the official consultation processes of the 
G20 and the United Nations, as well as monitoring the implementation of the SDGs through the 
Together 2030 civil society alliance15 (WEF, 2013, p. 7). Some civil society leaders feel that the 
power and influence of organised groups has emerged at the expense of becoming more 
‘establishment-orientated’, which is a departure from civil society’s political roots in numerous 
parts of the world (WEF, 2013, p. 7).  
                                                   
15 http://www.together2030.org/ 
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The concept of a transnational civic space or global civil society refers to the space within which 
individuals mobilise across borders on issues of global public interest (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 1). 
Research suggests that transnational civil society activism has implications for both national and 
international policy-making (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 1). For example, where states are inaccessible 
to the demands of domestic actors, CSOs can make strategic use of transnational coalitions and 
intergovernmental organisations to build pressure from ‘above’ in addition to pressure from 
‘below’ (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 1).  
The African context 
There is a lack of academic literature on contemporary African civil society, particularly in East 
and sub-Saharan African (O’Driscoll, 2018). Civil society in Africa is often based on religious or 
ethnic connections and includes traditional and spiritual forms of social organisations and 
networks of indigenous institutions (O’Driscoll, 2018; Kleibl & Munck, 2017, p. 204). In 
authoritarian regimes, it is likely that these civil society forms are more effective than (what has 
been termed) ‘Western professional civil society’ as they have more space to manoeuvre and 
have large support bases (O’Driscoll, 2018).  
Kleibl & Munck (2017) argue that the dominant conception of civil society is Eurocentric and a 
Northern imposition on local realities in African states (p. 204). Consequently, ‘official’ civil 
society in Africa is occupied by Western-type NGOs, certain churches and professional 
organisations and more traditional forms of African civil society are ignored or deemed irrelevant 
(Kleibl & Munck, 2017, p. 204). In terms of funding, indigenous non-state actors do not receive 
large shares of development funding: for example, only 10% of the total funding for US-funded 
health projects in Uganda was allocated to indigenous non-state actors16  
There is a wealth of grey literature on African civil society. For example, Privacy International 
(2018) argues that civil society groups in Africa are opposing new cyber security laws at a time 
when they are operating under increased threat of arbitrary arrest, unlawful searches and raids 
or funding restrictions. In Kenya, a petition by the Bloggers Association of Kenya, supported by 
the Kenyan Union of Journalists and Article 19 (the East Africa Journalists Defence Network) 
successfully challenged the new 2018 Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (Privacy 
International, 2018). The High Court suspended 26 of the Act’s provisions relating to offences 
that threaten freedom of expression, freedom of the media and right to privacy as well as new 
investigate powers (Privacy International, 2018).  
3. Civil society’s role and value 
 Civil society roles include: 
 ‘watchdog’ holding governments and institutions to account (for example, some CSOs 
monitor human rights abuses and provide information to both domestic constituencies 
and international organisations/ other states (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 6))17 
                                                   
16 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/may/07/africa-diaspora-
philanthropy-development 
17 As such, they act as ‘informal auditors’, imposing costs on states that would prefer to keep such information 
private (this may contribute to those states restricting civil society) (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 6). 
10 
 Advocate/representative raising awareness of issues, giving a voice to the marginalised 
and advocating for change (for example, Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous 
Organisations of Honduras campaigns on issues such as logging and dams which will 
affect indigenous peoples18) 
 Service provider (for example, Village Water Zambia provide water and sanitation in rural 
areas). 
As mentioned above, civil society is also a recognised partner in the development process and 
contributes to global governance processes. The Asian Development Bank outline five roles for 
civil society in advancing the sustainable development goals (SDGs): 
 Complement government poverty alleviation programmes with community-based tailored 
assistance using evidence-based, innovative and sustained solutions; 
 Localising the SDGs and monitoring progress; 
 Promote citizen-centric, collaborative governance (as many CSOs in Asia’s developing 
countries operate at grassroots level, so have active engagement with local actors and 
citizens) and co-production (whereby citizens produce or improve existing services 
without relying too much on public agencies); 
 Advocating for the poor, including lobbying government; 
 Empowering women for climate action (Nazal, 2018).  
Examples of civil society roles in 2018 
Global civil society: Bangladesh’s Ready Made Garment Industry 
NGOs and trade unions in both Bangladesh and countries that consume clothes made in 
Bangladesh have been working together to improve working conditions, raise awareness and call 
for a fair minimum wage. For example, the Clean Clothes Campaign, a global alliance of NGOs 
and trade unions is currently running a campaign calling for fashion brand H&M (the biggest 
buyer of clothes from Bangladesh) to ‘Turn Around’ and honour its commitment that the 850,000 
workers who make their clothes will be paid a living wage by the end of 201819.  
The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh was launched in 2013 after the collapse of 
the Rana Plaza building, which housed a number of garment factories20. The Accord is an 
independent, legally binding agreement between brands and trade unions, with four NGO 
witnesses (the Clean Clothes Campaign, the International Labor Rights Forum, the Worker 
Rights Consortium and Maquila Solidarity Network). The NGOs and trade unions have been 
monitoring implementation, running campaigns to ensure brands follow through on their 
commitments, highlighting problems with implementation and campaigning (successfully) for 
compensation for the families of workers who lost their lives in the 2013 building collapse.  
                                                   
18 http://copinhenglish.blogspot.com/ 
19 For more information on the campaign see: https://cleanclothes.org/news/2018/10/12/international-solidarity-
with-the-workers-in-bangladesh-who-demand-the-16-000-taka-minimum-wage 
20 For more information see: http://bangladeshaccord.org/ 
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National civil society: Zambia 
Civil society in Zambia occupy a number of roles. For example, Village Water Zambia, supported 
by funding from international NGOs including the Norwegian Church Aid Alliance, install 
boreholes in rural areas, provide hygiene and sanitation training in schools and villages, and 
install latrines in schools21. In addition to domestic NGOs, international NGOs such as Oxfam are 
active in Zambia. For example, Oxfam has been working to improve livelihoods in the Copperbelt 
region, including launching a Land Rights Centre22.  
Faith groups are integral members of civil society in Zambia, with groups providing a number of 
services including running schools. Faith-based organisations include the Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA), which runs drop-in centres around the country for women and 
children in crisis situations23.  
Zambia has 288 rural chiefdoms: this system of traditional leadership includes village 
headmen/women, local chiefs, and prominent tribal chiefs (in the case of the Lozi people, this is 
their king, the Litunga). The system also varies by tribe. The government of Zambia, NGOs and 
international organisations recognise the role of traditional leadership in Zambian society. For 
example, in November 2017, over 30 spouses of traditional leaders from various chiefdoms 
participated in a dialogue meeting in Lusaka with the government, international organisations and 
donors on the subject of safeguarding adolescent girls at the community level24. Zambia’s First 
Lady stated that as “custodians of customs and traditions, traditional leaders can be champions, 
initiators and agents of change towards eliminating child marriage, teenage pregnancy and 
gender-based violence"25. 
Advocacy and delivering services 
Many domestic African organisations working with gender and sexual minorities deliver critical 
services as well as engaging in advocacy (Mbote, 2016). These organisations often face a 
difficult or repressive climate and do not always receive support from other civil society 
organisations when faced with government moves to restrict them (Mbote, 2016). For example, 
the Kenyan High Court has ruled that the government cannot block the National Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission, but the group is still unregistered (Mbote, 2016). In 
Botswana, a similar organisation won a protracted case for registration: the Catholic Church 
labelled the judgement a deliberate attempt to push dangerous agendas and ideologies that are 
un-African and un-Christian (Mbote, 2016).  
                                                   
21 For more information see: http://villagewaterzambia.org.zm/ 
22 http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/countries-list/civil-society-
organisations/en/?country_iso3=ZMB 
23 http://www.fao.org/gender-landrights-database/country-profiles/countries-list/civil-society-
organisations/en/?country_iso3=ZMB 
24 For more information see https://zambia.unfpa.org/en/news/spouses-zambian-traditional-leaders-commit-
safeguarding-health-and-well-bieng-adolescent-girls 
25 For more information see https://zambia.unfpa.org/en/news/spouses-zambian-traditional-leaders-commit-
safeguarding-health-and-well-bieng-adolescent-girls 
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Mbote (2016) argues that funding for organisations representing marginalised groups is critical to 
their success, because they are unlikely to raise resources from their membership (who may 
suffer from economic impoverishment) or even wealthier citizens in their own countries. 
However, there are few organisations that fund gender and sexual minorities specific issues 
globally, and for those that do, this funding represents a tiny portion of their budgets (Mbote, 
2016).   
Partnerships with the private sector 
These include ‘bottom of the pyramid’ business models, creating new products and services to 
target unmet needs, and setting voluntary standards for a specific issue or industry sector (WEF, 
2013, p. 9). Examples include: 
 CARE in Bangladesh partnering with Danone communities to form a rural distribution 
system targeting marginalised people; 
 Mercy Corps co-founded MiCRO with Haiti’s largest microfinance institution Fonkoze, 
partnering with DFID and Swiss Re (WEF, 2013, p. 9).  
Business leaders from major multinationals are actively contributing to global governance 
processes, for example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WEF, 2013, 
p. 10). Some actors have expressed concern at the emergence of the private sector in the civil 
society space (see for example, CIVICUS, 2018). 
The value of civil society 
Green (2017) argues that civil society is at a crossroads: it is buffeted on one side by questions 
about its relevance, legitimacy and accountability from governments and their beneficiaries, and 
on the other side it is having to adjust to a rapidly deteriorating operating environment (closing 
spaces is discussed in section 4 of this report). Questions about the value of civil society mean 
that CSOs are facing more pressure to demonstrate their value to and connection with local 
communities (Green, 2017). Increasing public distrust, combined with uncertainty about the 
relevance and legitimacy of CSO has called into question civil society effectiveness in bringing 
about real change (VanDyck, 2017). For example, recent safeguarding scandals, including the 
actions of Oxfam workers in Haiti, have raised questions about the role and value of NGOs, from 
both the UK public and internationally26.  
Green’s 2017 report on civil society at a crossroads highlights how many CSOs rely on donor 
support to enact the change they want, which has led to critiques of their grant-driven business 
model, including the failure of traditional CSOs to bring transformative change. However, 
traditional CSOs have achieved impressive on the ground results, including improvements in 
maternal and child health, access to education and holding governments and companies to 
account (Green, 2017). Critics allege that these successes are palliative rather than 
transformational for three reasons:  
 Many traditional CSOs lack deep roots in the communities in which they work;  
                                                   
26 For more information see https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/15/timeline-oxfam-sexual-exploitation-
scandal-in-haiti 
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 Donors’ insistence on quantifiable results has created a bias towards a limited set of 
projects and service delivery as opposed to a focus on transformation or systemic 
change; 
 Organisations are accountable ‘upward’ to donors rather than ‘downwards’ to their 
beneficiaries, putting donor satisfaction above CSOs broader goals (Green, 2017).  
VanDyck (2017) argues that CSOs are facing questions about their relevance, legitimacy and 
accountability from governments and beneficiaries because of a widening gap between the 
sector, governments and beneficiaries. Many traditional CSOs are dependent on short-term 
funding, which creates incentives to focus on achieving future funding rather than gaining 
community buy-in and ensuring the sustainability of projects (Green, 2017). Consequently, 
traditional CSOs have been accused of being illegitimate, out of touch, or in the sector for 
prestige or money (Green, 2017). For example, India’s Prime Minister has accused 
environmental and community based organisations opposing large-scale investment projects of 
being foreign puppets, working against India’s national interest (Green, 2017).  
New and emerging forms of civic activism have disrupted traditional CSOs and may be better 
placed or able to meet the needs of their communities more efficiently and sustainably (Green, 
2017). For example, social movements using social media may be able to bring together more 
people around a common cause than traditional advocacy organisations, which typically rely on 
known supporters (Green, 2017). Combined with the concerns outlined above, this has led some 
commentators to question the viability of the traditional grant driven CSO model (Green, 2017). 
However, Green (2017) argues that there are synergies between the two forms and the key is to 
build bridges between the two.  
Debates about the role and value of civil society are likely to continue. However, it is important to 
remember the contribution that civil society makes to improving the lives of some of the world’s 
poorest people and advocating/campaigning for positive change around the world. For example, 
in 2017-2018, Wateraid UK reached over 1.3 million people in the developing world with clean 
water; volunteer movements in Kerala, India and the US saved lives during natural disasters in 
2018; and social movements including Black Lives Matter focused attention on important social 
issues. 
In terms of international development and the value of civil society, an interesting trend is the 
movement to #shiftthepower27. Launched in 2016 as a hashtag by the Global Fund for 
Community Foundations in the run-up to their conference in Johannesburg, #’shiftthepower aims 
to move development away from its current top-down, top-heavy system and towards people-
based development. More research is needed into how this movement and grassroots, 
community-based organisations and new models of philanthropy including local giving circles are 
creating positive changes and new forms of civil society. Some of the issues raised by 
#shiftthepower are also relevant in the case of diaspora contributions to development, which are 
the focus of the following sub-section of this report.  
                                                   
27 For more information see https://www.rethinkingpoverty.org.uk/cross-posts/shiftthepower-two-years/ 
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The value of civil society: the case of the diaspora  
A diaspora is a community of people living outside their country of origin, whilst maintaining 
active ties with it (MADE, 2016, p. 9). In 2015, there were approximately 250 million people living 
outside their country of origin and diasporas remitted USD 431 billion (MADE, 2016, p. 7). In 
2017, remittance flows to low and medium income countries were USD 466 billion and globally 
were USD 613 billion (World Bank, 2018, p. v). Remittance flows are expected to increase in 
2018 (World Bank, 2018, p. v).  
Diaspora remittances are extremely important in sustaining local livelihoods and supporting 
national development, particularly in Africa (CFLP, 2015, p. 1). Academics at Boston University 
argue that remitters and their families are at the forefront of forging a new kind of global 
community with transnational families and inter-personal networks that are creating new forms of 
social and economic interconnections (CFLP, 2015, p. 15). Diaspora organisations and networks 
are important civil society actors for mobilising diaspora communities’ economic, social and 
cultural resources (MADE, 201628).   
Diasporas contribute to their communities of origin through both individual and collective 
remittances (CFLP, 2015, p. 1). Individual remittances to family members are largely used for 
consumption, education and healthcare (CFLP, 2015, p. 13). Some evidence suggests that 
approximately 80% of the total remittances to Africa are used for education (CFLP, 2015, p. 13). 
Diaspora networks can also be sources of social remittances in the form of ideas, values and 
skills transferred to the migrant’s community of origin (CFLP, 2015, p. 2).  
Collective remittances are invested or used for development projects administered through 
networks and organisations including ‘hometown associations’, ethnic associations, alumni 
associations, religious associations, welfare and refugee groups etc. (CFLP, 2015, p. 2). For 
example, women’s microfinance initiative Mwanzo Upya in eastern Democratic Republic of 
Congo is a diaspora co-development project established in 2012 and organised by US NGO 
Congolese Genocide Awareness Inc. (CFLP, 2015, p. 9)29. Research on the impacts of collective 
remittances, including in fragile and post-conflict situations, is scarce (CFLP, 2015, p. 2)30.  
The World Bank estimated official migrant remittances to sub-Saharan Africa were USD 40 billion 
in 2015 (CFLP, 2015, p. 1). Remittances have increased approximately six-fold since 2000 
(CFLP, 2015, p. 1). Informal remittances (sent outside the formal financial system) to Africa are 
estimated to be twice that of the official estimate (CFLP, 2015, p. 2). Private remittances 
constitute the largest source of international financial flows to Africa and a stable source of 
foreign exchange for national development (CFLP, 2015, p. 2). This is particularly important in 
                                                   
28 MADE, the Migration and Development Civil Society Network, is an open network of CSOs working on 
migration issues. It engages with policy-makers and other important stakeholders to protect on issues related to 
the well-being and protection of all migrants and communities. The network’s thematic Working Group on 
Diaspora and Migrants in Development was coordinated by AFFORD-UK (the African Foundation for 
Development), an African diaspora organisation. See http://afford-uk.org/about-us/about-afford/ for more 
information.  
29 In 2013, diaspora remittances to the DRC were USD 7 billion, approximately USD 1 billion less than the DRC 
government’s budget.  
30 There are some concerns that remittances could contribute to perpetuating conflict as well as contributing to 
peace-building (CFLP, 2015, p. 2).  
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light of diminishing aid flows from OECD countries to low-income countries in Africa (CFLP, 
2015, p. 2).   
Transaction costs  
Within the literature on the diaspora, one of the key issues is high transaction costs for 
remittances (see for example, MADE, 2016). In the first quarter of 2018, the global average cost 
of sending remittances was 7.1% of the amount sent (World Bank, 2018, p. v). Estimates of 
transaction costs are higher for Africa: for example, a 2015 report estimated transactions costs 
were 12.5% of the sum remitted (CFLP, 2015, p. 7). 
Factors contributing to high costs include de-risking measures31 by commercial banks and 
exclusive partnerships between national post office systems and a single money transfer 
operator (World Bank, 2018, p. v). These factors constrain the introduction of more efficient and 
cheaper technologies, including Internet and smartphone apps and blockchain, hinder the growth 
of formal remittances, restrict competition and increase prices (World Bank, 2018, p. v; CFLP, 
2015, p. 6).  
Reducing transaction costs would increase remittances’ value to the sender and the receiver 
(MADE, 2016, p. 6). The World Bank estimates that up to USD 100 billion could be raised 
annually by developing countries through reducing remittance costs, reducing migrant 
recruitment costs, mobilising diaspora savings and philanthropic contributions from migrants 
(MADE, 2016, p. 5). Reducing the costs of remittances is part of the international development 
agenda. For example, the G8 have set a target of reducing costs to 5% and the UN’s Sustainable 
Development Goals have a target of 3% for costs by 2030 (CFLP, 2015, p. 1, p. 8). If the G8 
target is met, it would increase the amount recipients receive annually by USD 1. 8 billion (CFLP, 
2015, p. 8).  
Development, co-development and collective remittances 
The profile and contribution of diaspora communities to development are receiving increasing 
attention. For example, the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals call for the development of 
ways to mobilise diaspora savings and collective remittances, whilst the African Union argues 
that novel mechanisms are needed for harnessing and investing remittances for national 
development (CFLP, 2015, p. 1). MADE (2016) argue that policy efforts are necessary in 
receiving countries to integrate remittances into broader national development strategies and 
financial democracy initiatives (MADE, 2016, p. 9).  
Co-development projects are increasing (MADE, 2016). However, diaspora organisations, 
including diaspora-led NGOs face a number of problems, including a lack of funding and 
challenges working in partnership with ‘traditional’ NGOs32. Diaspora-led NGOs are often on the 
margins of the sector and one of the challenges is finding ways for diaspora groups and 
                                                   
31 For example, banks are closing the accounts of customers in countries or sectors deemed to pose a high risk 
of money laundering or terrorist financing (World Bank, 2018, p. 6).  
32 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/may/01/african-diaspora-global-
development 
16 
international NGOs to collaborate33. Examples of collaboration include Progressio working with 
Somaliland Focus UK to organise election observations in Somaliland since 200534. Vark (2013) 
suggests that due to the size of diaspora remittances to developing countries, collaboration 
between diaspora organisations and NGOs could significantly improve aid effectiveness35.  
Collective remittances, which are invested or used for entrepreneurship, can contribute positively 
to national development (MADE, 2016, p. 11). It is estimated that the African diaspora saves 
USD 53 billion annually, the majority of which is currently invested outside of Africa, instruments 
including diaspora bonds and other innovative financing mechanisms could mobilise these funds 
for development in Africa (MADE, 2016, p. 12). A study of the Caribbean diaspora found that 
40% had invested in a start-up of a company, with 57% of these companies being in the 
Caribbean (MADE, 2016, p. 12).  
A lack of skills, amongst other things, is responsible for the gap between potential diaspora 
investors and actual investors (MADE, 2016, p. 12). For example, a World Bank report on Sierra 
Leone found that between 45% and 63% of the diaspora surveyed were interested in investment, 
compared to 1% to 6% who had actually invested in bonds, equity, social impact and 
microenterprises (MADE, 2016, p. 13). AFFORD UK, through its business support centre in 
Sierra Leone, ABC, supports fast-growth small and medium sized enterprises that have the 
potential to create jobs locally (MADE, 2016, p. 14). National initiatives include the government of 
the Philippines BaLinkBayan online portal for diaspora engagement and the PinoyWise Filipino 
scheme, which supports the Filipino diaspora to start enterprises in the Philippines, save or 
invest (MADE, 2016, p. 15).   
Maximising diaspora investment requires strong public-private partnerships, adequate access to 
finance and capital, business training and skills development, as well as regulatory and policy 
interventions on national and transnational levels (MADE, 2016, p. 18). Research with the African 
diaspora in New England, USA, argues that institutional frameworks that enable a productive use 
of remittances are crucial, including organisational capacity building, access to financial services, 
development of business skills and relevant technical support (CFLP, 2015, p. 2). Diaspora 
members also highlighted the lack of opportunities to connect the relevant organisations and 
networks on the sending and receiving sides (CFLP, 2015, p. 2).   
4. Trends 
Closing Spaces 
Governments in numerous countries are restricting the space for civil society, particularly in the 
areas of advancing human rights or democratic principles (WEF, 2013, p. 7). Closing civil society 
spaces is not just taking place in southern countries, but in countries such as Russia, Hungary 
and Israel (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 7). Poppe & Wolff (2017) argue that debates about civil society 
                                                   
33 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/07/diaspora-bond-
conference-if-campaign 
34 http://www.somalilandfocus.org.uk/ 
35 https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/nov/07/diaspora-bond-
conference-if-campaign 
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and closing spaces are part of a wider trend, ‘the backlash against democracy promotion’ and 
contestation of the contemporary world order36. They also highlight how there can be a conflict 
between the promotion of human rights and democracy (which is the normative basis for many 
CSOs receiving support from global north governments and international organisations) and 
state claims to sovereignty, self-determination and non-interference (Poppe & Wolff, 2017). For 
example, in 2018, Uganda’s President Museveni blamed civil society, foreign interference and 
the media for political protests37. 
CIVICUS’ (2018, p. 4) State of Civil Society found that 109 out of 195 countries have closed, 
repressed or obstructed civic space38. Open civic space is characterised by freedom of 
association, peaceful assembly and freedom of expression: civil society depends on these three 
key rights39. CIVICUS (2018, p. 4) estimate that only 4% of the world’s population live in civic 
space that can be classified as open; 14% in narrowed civic space; 37% in obstructed civic 
space; 17% in repressed civic space; and, 28% in closed civic space. In 2017, laws regulating 
the right to protest came into force or were proposed in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Iraq, 
Norway, Paraguay, Russia and Tanzania; whilst, laws regulating free speech came into force or 
were proposed in Cote D’Ivoire, Fiji, Kazakhstan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Tunisia, Uruguay and 
Venezuela (CIVICUS, 2018, p. 8). Maina Kiai, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to 
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association, has argued that, in many places around the 
world, civic space is no longer shrinking but ‘already gone’ (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 2).  
CIVICUS (2018, p. 12) have linked closing civil society spaces to the rise of populism, repressive 
governments asserting national sovereignty and the rise of socially conservative forces. 
Additional drivers include the ‘war on terror’ following 9/11 (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 2). Civil society 
has been operating in an environment of ‘continuous decline’ in global political and civil liberties 
for the ‘past decade’ and deteriorating media freedom around the world (Kreienkamp, 2017). The 
International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law argues that 64 restrictive new laws and regulations 
were adopted by governments worldwide in 2015-16 leaving global civic space severely 
narrowed (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 3).  
UCL (University College London) have developed a new cross-country database documenting 
restrictive laws and practices in 177 countries from 2000 to 2014, as part of a new project to 
identify when, why and how states seek to silence civil society (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 3). This 
project suggests that restrictions against CSOs are pervasive and widespread, with certain 
regions at particular risk (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 3). Findings include: 
                                                   
36 The drivers of closing space for civil society are the subject of academic debate and include the war on terror/ 
fight against terrorism, the rise of populism and tensions exposed by mass social movements. For more 
information, see https://www.openglobalrights.org/closing-space-for-civil-society/. Closing space is occurring 
across all state types (democratic, authoritarian, hybrid, developed and developing, north and south).  
37 For more information see https://www.dw.com/en/ugandas-museveni-blames-civil-society-for-political-unrest/a-
45432927 
38 CIVICUS is a global civil society alliance, established in 1993 and headquartered in Johannesburg with 
representation at the UN Headquarters in New York and the UN offices in Geneva. For more information see 
https://www.civicus.org/index.php/who-we-are/about-civicus 
39 CIVICUS recognise that many other factors (e.g. levels of funding, strength d public trust) affect civil society’s 
success. However, CIVICUS civic space monitoring tool focus on the three key rights that form the basis for civil 
society. For more information see https://monitor.civicus.org/whatiscivicspace/ 
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 States who commit severe human rights abuses have a strong incentive to silence civil 
society, especially if they have signed human rights treaties; 
 Hybrid regimes (neither consolidated democracies or full autocracies) are more likely to 
impose restrictions; 
 There is also some evidence that states are more likely to restrict CSOs when faced with 
domestic security threats e.g. terrorism (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 6). 
States deploy a range of formal and informal strategies to undermine the credibility, financial 
stability and legal protection of CSOs (Kreienkamp, 2017): 
 Legislation regulating foreign funding including requirements for CSOs to report on 
foreign funding; 
 De-legitimisation campaigns that result in reputational costs, additional bureaucratic and 
administrative hurdles (e.g. requirement to file all planned activities in advance with the 
government), the risks of fines and other sanctions in case of non-compliance with new 
reporting targets, difficulties to access and engage with target groups, authorities and 
alternative national funders, and psychological pressures for the individuals involved; 
 Governments creating ‘loyal voices’ by establishing government –organised non-
governmental organisations (GONGOs), for example, the Myanmar Women’s Affairs 
Federation and Sudan’s Human Rights Organisation40.  
VanDyck (2017) argues that the establishment of GONGOs to infiltrate and gather information on 
the human rights community is an example of the growing adversarial relationship between 
governments and human rights organisations (p. 2). In response, a significant number of human 
rights, humanitarian, training and grassroots organisations have become reluctant to engage and 
collaborate with governments (VanDyck, 2017, p. 2).  
Increased surveillance 
Both the media and academics have expressed concerns about authorities’ increasing 
surveillance of civil society, particularly journalists and human rights campaigners. For example, 
the Citizen Lab at the University of Toronto argue that Pegasus spyware has been used to target 
civil society by spying on people through their mobile phones, including in Mexico41. Ahmed & 
Perlroth (2017) have labelled Mexico one of the most hostile environments for journalists.  
Since 2011, at least three Mexican federal agencies have purchased Pegasus spyware, which 
infiltrates smartphones to monitor calls, texts, emails, contacts and calendars, as well as being 
able to use the microphone and camera for surveillance (Ahmed & Perlroth, 2017). It is alleged 
that these agencies have illegally used Pegasus software to target human rights lawyers, 
journalists and anti-corruption activists (Ahmed & Perlroth, 2017). The Mexican government deny 
that it is behind the hacking of civil society actors’ phones and the nature of the Pegasus 
software means that it is hard to determine exactly who is behind the specific hacking attempts 
(Ahmed & Perlroth, 2017). Experts at Toronto University’s Citizen Lab believe it was the Mexican 
                                                   
40 https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/10/13/what-is-a-gongo/ 
41 https://citizenlab.ca/2018/09/hide-and-seek-tracking-nso-groups-pegasus-spyware-to-operations-in-45-
countries/ 
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government as Pegasus software can only be used by the agency that purchased it (Ahmed & 
Perlroth, 2017).   
Increased violence  
More than 1,000 human rights defenders were killed, harassed, detained or subjected to smear 
campaigns in 2016: more than 75% of those killed were in Latin America (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 
3). The rise in killings of environmental activists in Latin America has been linked to the 
expansion of extractive industries, the influx of associated multinational corporations and criminal 
enterprises, and a prevailing culture of effective state-sanctioned impunity (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 
8). In 2016, Honduran environmental and indigenous rights campaigner, Berta Caceres who was 
campaigning against the construction of the Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam, was murdered42. In 
the following two years, according to Amnesty International, those campaigning for justice for 
Caceres have been threatened. Eight people have been arrested in connection with the murder, 
some of whom have links to the company building the dam and others to the military.   
Media restrictions 
Governments are controlling the free flow of information in order to control, monitor or silence 
civil society (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 8). This includes journalists and media outlets being 
pressured into self-censorship (e.g. by the risk of costly lawsuits or personal risk), government 
increasing control of digital technologies and social media problems (e.g. by spreading fake 
news), and shutting down the internet when facing intense resistance (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 8). 
Reporters without Borders (2017) argue that media freedom globally is more under threat now 
than ever before, with a worsening situation in nearly two-thirds of the 180 countries it includes in 
its World Press Freedom Index43. In 2017, Cameroon introduced a three-month internet block in 
its Anglophone regions; whilst Iran and Togo shut down the internet during mass protests 
(CIVICUS, 2018, p. 11). Viet Nam, jailed at least 25 online activists in 2017 (CIVICUS, 2018, p. 
11).  
Restrictions on funding 
Targeting foreign funding is one of the most effective and commonly used strategies to curb civil 
society, often justified on the grounds of increasing transparency (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 7): 
 In India, at least 30 CSOs, including Greenpeace India have been refused a government 
license to receive foreign funding in 2016 because their activities were not deemed to be 
in the national interest; 
 In Ethiopia, severe restrictions on foreign funding, introduced in 2009 resulted in 25% of 
local groups closing within three years.  
Governments and policy-makers normally invoke the need to protect national security and 
sovereignty when adopting restrictions on foreign funding for domestic CSOs (Kreienkamp, 2017, 
                                                   
42 For more information see https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2018/03/legacy-of-honduran-activist-
berta-caceres-lives-on/ 
43 https://rsf.org/en/2017-press-freedom-index-ever-darker-world-map 
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p. 5)44. For example, when introducing a 2004 bill to ban foreign funding for CSOs Zimbabwe’s 
President Mugabe stated: “We cannot allow them to be conduits or instruments of foreign 
interference in our national affairs” (quoted in Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 5). Academic research has 
suggested that governments are more likely to restrict foreign or foreign-supported CSOs when 
they are undergoing domestic political competition or challenges (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 5).  
Many governments, including Russia, Hungary and Israel are regulating or cutting their funding 
for civil society, this includes making funding dependent on governmental approval, implementing 
a cap, prohibiting funding by certain donors or for certain kinds of activities, making it mandatory 
to channel donor funding through government backs, or banning foreign funding altogether 
(Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 7).  
Legal and regulatory measures used by governments to curtail international financing include:  
 Requiring prior government approval for the receipt of international funding 
 Enacting ‘foreign agent’ legislation to stigmatise internationally funded CSOs 
 Caps on the amount of foreign funding a CSO can receive 
 Requirement for foreign funding to be routed through government controlled entities 
 Restricting activities that can be undertaken with foreign funding 
 Prohibiting CSOs from receiving funding from specific donors 
 Constraining international funding through the overly broad application of anti–money 
laundering and counterterrorism measures 
 Taxing the receipt of international funding 
 Imposing onerous reporting requirements on the receipt of international funding 
 Using defamation, treason, and other laws to bring criminal charges against recipients of 
international funding (Rutzen, 2015, p. 31). 
Strategies for resisting closing spaces 
In Botswana and Kenya, LGBT rights groups have successfully challenged government refusals 
to allow them to register (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 10). In 2014, UN Special Rapporteur, Maina Kiai 
launched a project to support strategic litigation in domestic and regional courts for cases related 
to the right of freedom of peaceful assembly and of association (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 10). 
However, this like other strategies to resist closing spaces, has some limitations: litigation is 
costly, the likelihood of success is dependent on the independence of the judiciary, and if 
successful, states can refuse to follow court orders (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 10).  
Other strategies include: 
 Network support (allows CSOs to engage in collective advocacy action);  
 Diversifying funding; 
 Forming links with international business; 
                                                   
44 Restrictions on foreign funding are not just occurring in southern countries, but in Europe as well, including 
Russia. Hungary’s Prime Minister has suggested foreign funded CSOs could threaten Hungary’s sovereignty and 
national security (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 5).  
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 Third-party states voicing concern over civil society restrictions and exerting pressure on 
governments; 
 Development of early warning mechanisms, including a suggested EU ‘Shrinking Space 
Early Warning’ mechanism that would allow Member States to respond to new restrictive 
legislation before it is passed (Kreienkamp, 2017, p. 11).   
CIVICUS (2018) argue that ‘the fightback is on’: there are signs that citizens are organising and 
mobilising in new and creative ways to defend civic freedoms (p. 4). They cite El Salvador and 
the Dominican Republic as examples. In El Salvador, following years of civil society advocacy, 
the government passed a law banning environmental and socially harmful gold-mining practises 
(CIVICUS, 2018, p. 16). In the Dominican Republic, the Green March Movement brought people 
from all sections of society together to protest corruption (CIVICUS, 2018, p. 16)45.  
Changing funding sources 
International civil society leaders argue there has been a decline in funding available for 
advocacy, rights-based activities and causes that challenge the status quo (WEF, 2013, p. 7). As 
part of the restrictions on civil society, some governments have taken steps to limit access to 
national and foreign funding (WEF, 2013, p. 7). The WEF (2013) also argue that restrictions on 
civil society’s space has implications for the willingness of the private sector in some countries to 
engage in social responsibility programmes due to worries about these being seen as a threat to 
the state (p. 7).  
Funding sources are changing for both domestic civil society organisations in developing 
countries and northern NGOs who operate in southern contexts. Traditional funding streams are 
shrinking along with modifications to donor criteria including diversification of funding sources, 
requirements for private sector partners and stringent requirements to demonstrate impact (WEF, 
2013, p. 15). New funding sources include market philanthropists, social entrepreneurs, social 
investment products and crowd-sourcing (WEF, 2013, p. 15). Geopolitical and economic shifts 
including the expansion of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa and the changing focus of 
donor countries from aid to trade with key emerging market economies are also shifting the axis 
of development (WEF, 2013, p. 15).  
In the interviews for the WEF’s 2013 Report into the future of civil society, civil society leaders 
identified competition for resources and visibility as a key barrier to effectiveness (p. 16). For civil 
society based in the global south, dwindling donor funding and shifting priorities driven by foreign 
policy considerations pose a threat to their sustainability (VanDyck, 2017, p. 2). VanDyck (2017) 
argues that in light of this, civil society in the global south needs to shift its focus and strengthen 
its ability to mobilise resources from domestic constituencies and reduce excessive dependency 
on foreign donors (p. 5). Currently, the relationship between donors and civil society is ad hoc, 
short-term and on a project basis, consequently civil society groups can be seen as 
implementers of donors’ development or foreign policy agendas and donors do not feel an 
                                                   
45 Examples of restricted civil society space in the region include Nicaragua. In 2007, the government introduced 
laws limiting funding to CSOs, banned INGO, and introduced laws to prevent organisations from becoming 
political parties. This has escalated into violent repression of citizen mobilisations. For more information see 
http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/nicaragua.html 
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obligation to support them to become robust or sustainable beyond project timelines (VanDyck, 
2017, p. 5).    
Technology 
Civil society groups are becoming more technologically literate, using social media platforms and 
new tools such as podcasts for awareness raising and fundraising and technological tools to 
improve the efficacy of their work (Jezard, 2018). For example, WWF (the Worldwide Fund for 
Nature) use aerial drone technology, animal tracking devices and infrared cameras in their work 
combatting illegal poaching of endangered species (Jezard, 2018). UNICEF’s U-Report bot is a 
free SMS social monitoring tool: in 2015, working with government ministers in Liberia, it helped 
to uncover a scandal in which teachers were exploiting children by awarding grades and pass 
marks in return for sex (Jezard, 2018). In under 24 hours, 13,000 people had responded, 
counselling services identified and a support helpline established (Jezard, 2018). Technology, as 
outlined in section 1 of this report, has also 
Faith groups 
The WEF (2013) argue that there is increasing interest in and prominence of faith and religious 
culture in public life, accompanied by a growing interest in the role of faith groups (p. 11). Factors 
driving this interest are appreciation of the dynamism and the growth of faith in many parts of the 
world; the resources inherent within faith communities, e.g. human and social capital; 
governments extending new forms of participatory governance to include faith communities; and, 
the growing presence of religions online (WEF, 2013, p. 11). Faith groups play a number of roles 
in development including that of service provider: in some African countries, the faiths provide 
70% of health services (WEF, 2013, p. 11). Faith groups also play an interesting role in the 
promotion of human rights: for example, in some cases arguing for protections for LGBTI people 
and in others adopting an anti-LGBTI people stance46. The role of faith groups is extremely 
interesting and merits more attention than is possible in this report.     
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